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Assessing cognitive bias in forensic decisions: A review and outlook. 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, a number of studies have demonstrated that forensic examiners can be biased by 
contextual information. However, concerns relating to methodological flaws and ecological validity 
attenuate how much the current body of knowledge can be applied to real-life operational settings.  The 
current review takes a narrative approach to synthesising the literature across the forensic science. 
Further, the review considers both primary research on bias within forensic science and alternative 
theoretical perspectives surrounding contextual information and bias, to present an alternative view that 
bias does not always lead to error.  The implications for future research are outlined, suggesting that 
studies on bias in forensic decisions should be conducted in collaboration between forensic scientists 
and cognitive psychologists. Only then rigorous and ecological valid experiments can be created that 
will be able to assess how bias influences forensic analysis and judgments in operationally valid 
settings. 
 
Keywords: forensic science, forensic psychology, decision science, bias, forensic assessment, 
decision making. 
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Evidence derived from traces of DNA is considered the gold standard of forensic science 1 and 
is strongly weighted by jurors when reaching a verdict 2. Within the courtroom, DNA evidence 
is viewed as an important tool when deciphering the guilt of a suspect. In addition to DNA 
evidence, different types of forensic evidence are typically analysed by forensic examiners to 
assist the court in its determination on substantive technical issues, which in turn may aid the 
jury in reaching a verdict (e.g., fingerprint analysis;3). Forensic evidence can be placed inside 
two broad categories: 1) pattern-matching techniques (non-scientific techniques that use terms 
such as ‘match’ and non-match; i.e., fingerprint analysis); and 2) DNA analysis (scientifically 
valid technique that uses probabilistic determinations;4). Recent research has highlighted that 
forensic evaluations of the first type may not be entirely objective5 and that subjectivity in 
pattern matching techniques may have contributed to miscarriages of justice, resulting in the 
payment of significant compensations 6,7. Bias in forensic scientists is therefore a real cause for 
concern within the forensic science community8.   
The National Academy of Sciences9 and the UK Forensic Science Regulator 10 have suggested 
that forensic evaluations of pattern-matching techniques may be significantly affected by 
contextual bias. Previous research has shown that forensic examiners may fall prey to 
contextual and confirmation biases when ambiguous forensic information needs to be 
interpreted 5, 11. Contextual bias is the effect that extraneous information may have on the 
forensic examiners’ decisions 5, while confirmation bias occurs when an initial hypothesis 
influences how a decision maker interprets and/or searches for information, preferring 
information that supports their expectations12,13. Dror and Hampikian3 and Krane14 suggested 
that contextual biases may also influence DNA evidence evaluations, as an example of the gold 
standard in forensic science. Their findings may have serious implications for both the 
prosecution and the defence due to the central importance and extensive use of DNA-related 
forensic evidence in the exoneration and incarceration of individuals15 and may call into 
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question the validity of a significant number of verdicts, as some verdicts may have been rested 
upon biased forensic evaluations.  
In this review we first discuss the empirical evidence of the effects that contextual information 
has on forensic scientists, followed by a discussion of the ecological validity and experimental 
rigour of these studies. We will argue that bias can also be beneficial. This will be based upon 
scientific evidence from the forensic science community and literature from decision science. 
Furthermore, we highlight potential issues with some of the current research on contextual bias 
in forensic scientists.  
 
Contextual Biases in Forensic Scientists. 
In recent years, research has highlighted that forensic science may not be as objective as 
commonly assumed by legal professionals and forensic scientists16. For instance, Dror et al.5 
found that if ambiguous latent fingerprints (prints recovered from a crime scene that are 
invisible to the naked eye) were presented alongside contextual data, including emotionally 
resonant images and stories, then fingerprint examiners were increasingly likely to find a 
‘match’ between prints found at the crime scene and a reference sample from the accused even 
if one did not exist. Dror, Wertheim, Fraser-Mackenzie and Walajtys17 further found that when 
fingerprint examiners were using an Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS; a 
digital system that allows fingerprints to be stored, and searched for), latent fingerprints from 
the top of the AFIS list were much more likely to be matched incorrectly than fingerprints from 
the bottom of the AFIS list. Kukucka and Kassin18 found that handwriting comparisons were 
also influenced by the knowledge of confessions. Further, Cooper and Meterko19 conducted a 
systematic review and found that confirmation bias can influence the judgments of forensic 
scientists when contextual information is present. This shows that forensic examiners, just like 
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other decision makers, are influenced by non-relevant information when making a decision. 
The inclusion of extra-legal factors in the decision processes can lead to more incorrect (or 
inaccurate) decisions being made which can have serious ramifications for decisions around 
the guilt and innocence of suspects in criminal cases.  
Despite the apparent stability of these effects via replication across different forensic evaluation 
contexts (see Cooper and Meterko’s 19), some decision scientists have argued that biases and 
fallacies may be an artefact of experimental design and not necessarily the result of cognitive 
processing in a natural or typical environment19. Therefore, these experimental results may lack 
generalisability, and may be confined to psychologist’s laboratories; this will be touched upon 
more in the next section. Nevertheless, high profile, real-life cases suggest that bias in forensic 
examiners may not just be confined to psychological studies. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) mistakenly identified a Muslim male as being responsible for the Madrid 
train bombings16. The examiners had drawn the ‘match’ from a database that contained known 
prints. After this initial false positive, a number of other experts confirmed the false positive 
result16. This real-life case demonstrated that forensic examiners who were provided with 
contextual information (i.e., surrounding the initial false positive) were more likely to confirm 
a match rather than disconfirm it. Dror et al.16 then used this real-life example in an 
experimental manipulation, with five fingerprint experts acting as participants in this study.  
Participants in this study were given prints from a crime scene, prints from a suspect, and were 
provided with contextual information. The context they were provided with was that the prints 
had been incorrectly identified by FBI experts when they were analysing evidence from the 
Madrid train bombing. Unknown to the fingerprint experts, they had previously identified the 
same prints as a match in another real-life case from their own case history. Four out of five 
participants changed their decision based on the context provided, thus demonstrating that 
forensic examiners can be easily influenced by contextual information.  
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This confirmation bias extends to the evaluation and interpretation of different types of 
evidence, the most surprising of which is DNA evidence. Dror and Hampikian3 used a DNA 
mixture (biological material gained from more than one individual20) from a real case of gang 
rape to test whether or not ambiguous DNA evidence is also susceptible to bias. In this case, 
one of the individuals who had participated in the rape testified against another member (from 
which the target DNA was acquired) in exchange for a lower sentence and the forensic 
examiners concluded that the target DNA could not be excluded from the DNA mixture. In 
Dror and Hampikian’s3 study, the same material was presented to 17 forensic examiners, but 
without any contextual information about the defendant/accused (i.e., the testimony from the 
assailant). From the 17 examiners, 12 decided that the target DNA could be excluded and four 
found that the DNA evidence was inconclusive. This study illustrates that the interpretation of 
ambiguous DNA evidence is not consistent, and that it can be influenced by contextual 
information.  
The potential for subjectiveity when interpreting complex and ambiguous DNA mixtures was 
also shown in two further studies: DNA MIX05 and DNA MIX1321.  MIX05 was a study in 
which 69 forensic science laboratories evaluated and interpreted a two-person DNA mixture in 
four separate sexual assault mock trials21. The results of MIX05 showed that forensic scientists 
were more consistent when making judgements on major contributors (i.e., a complete, or 
almost complete DNA profile from a contributor is present) in two-person DNA mixtures when 
the genotypes of the contributors were not similar22, and that they were less consistent when 
making judgments on minor contributor genotypes22. In the MIX13 study, 108 forensic 
laboratories were presented with five complex mock crimes with up to four possible 
contributors to the DNA mixture21.  The main finding of this study was that DNA mixture 
interpretations varied significantly across different forensic laboratories22. Both MIX05 and 
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MIX13 showed that DNA mixtures are complex and ambiguous, which leaves this type of 
evidence open to influence from contextual biases3 and subjective reasoning. 
The ambiguity of DNA evidence can also be influenced through factors such as environmental 
contamination (e.g., low template DNA - amplifying a limited amount of DNA so that it can 
be analysed23; and temperature at crime scene). Krane et al.24 suggested that DNA evidence is 
not always strong and that ambiguities allow contextual information to influence analysis and 
judgments. Forensic examiners typically use electropherograms when analysing DNA 
evidence. This equipment establishes stable positions on chromosomes (i.e., loci) and measures 
the presence of alleles (genetic variations25). The presence of an allele on a loci is represented 
on the user interface by a peak or bump, and no bump indicates that an allele is absent14. This 
method of analysis allows examiners to compare the DNA of a suspect with a DNA sample 
found at a crime scene. Sometimes, however, a number of factors (e.g., environmental 
contamination) can make it difficult to identify whether or not an allele is present on a loci (as 
peaks may be present but small), thus introducing noise in the analysis14. Krane14 proposed that 
this noise makes DNA evidence ambiguous, allowing contextual biases to affect the forensic 
examiners when analysing DNA evidence. 
Thompson26 elaborated on the interaction between context and ambiguous evidence and 
suggested that false positives (e.g., the incarceration of innocent individuals) were most likely 
to occur due to subjective interpretations of ambiguous DNA evidence. Further, Thompson26 
proposed that ambiguity arises from DNA results if the sample is small and/or degraded26.  
Limited DNA samples are also the samples which are least likely to be retested, because the 
samples may have been used-up in the initial testing. As a consequence, these limited samples 
are likely to be open to subjective interpretations, which may then influence how the jury 
perceives the defendant26. These subjective interpretations of DNA evidence may be the result 
of the forensic scientist having knowledge of the case and/or suspect27. Thompson (2011) 
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further suggested that it is inappropriate for forensic scientists to consider contextual 
information, as their role is not trier of fact (i.e., they are not the jury) but to provide expert 
opinion on a piece of circumstantial evidence. This expert opinion should then be used 
alongside context by the trier of fact to assess the guilt of the defendant28, thus highlighting 
that context should be used by the jury but not forensic scientists as their roles differ in the 
legal system. In addition, Thompson’s research26, 28, 29 therefore indicates that objective science 
has the potential for error as soon as subjective interpretations are involved.  
A recent study by Kukucka, Kassin, Zapf and Dror30 showed that forensic experts also find it 
difficult to acknowledge bias in their own decision-making. Forensic decision makers were 
more likely to perceive bias in other forensic domains, less likely to perceive bias in their own 
domain, and least likely to acknowledge bias as a factor that might influence their own 
judgement30. This lack of awareness surrounding forensic bias shows that forensic scientists 
may be unconsciously integrating irrelevant contextual information alongside objective 
information from their forensic analysis when making matching decisions between a sample 
and a target. Furthermore, contextual and confirmation biases may be hidden from view in 
forensic science, as other biases (such as the over-confidence effect) may stop decision makers 
from being able to reflect on their own biases.  
In summary, the aim of the current section was to highlight some issues in the literature on 
contextual information and its effects on forensic analysis and judgments. The current body of 
research has been primarily focussed on context and the negative effects it has on forensic 
scientists, despite research such as Dror et al.16 failing to measure the accuracy of the  
judgments made by forensic scientists. The next two sections will present alternative 
perspectives on the effects of context on forensic judgments. First, methodological limitations 
and concerns surrounding ecological validity will be presented, highlighting that it is to soon 
to establish how context influences forensic scientists in operationally valid settings. Second, 
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an alternative perspective will be presented that will utilise commentary and research in the 
forensic science community and the theoretical background of bounded rationality from 
decision science. This alternative perspective will be that context (or bias) does not always lead 
to inaccurate decision making and may aid forensic scientists when they are interpreting 
forensic evidence.  
 
Experimental rigour and ecological validity in contextual bias investigations. 
Despite the amount of evidence suggesting that contextual information biases forensic 
scientists, there are two main issues with some of the literature that may attenuate how much 
the current body of knowledge can be applied to real world investigations: 1) experimental 
rigour (which will encompass for the purposes of this articles, all aspects of experimental 
investigations (i.e., sample size, recruitment styles, randomization processes); 2) ecological 
validity (as mentioned before). Each of these two issues will be addressed in turn.  
First, as noted in Cooper and Meterko’s19 systematic review, some of the research used in 
support of the negative effects that contextual biases have on forensic decisions have 
methodological flaws. Cooper and Meterko19 highlighted that sample sizes in articles 
investigating contextual bias can be limited, and thus attenuate the power and generalisability 
of the analyses. For example, in Dror et al.’s16 study on the effects of contextual information 
the sample size was five and the authors did not conduct inferential statistics, thus it is difficult 
to make generalisable conclusions from the study’s findings. Related to this, many studies in 
Cooper and Meterko’s19 systematic review had not conducted statistical analysis correctly, as 
tests were sometimes conducted despite statistical assumptions being breached (e.g., chi-square 
analysis conducted despite expected frequencies being below five).  In addition, the systematic 
review of Cooper and Meterko19 stated: “…none of the studies provided information about the 
10 
 
randomization procedures, as is recommended for randomized clinical trials” (p.42), thus 
highlighting that these studies are not examples of true experiments. In a proper experimental 
design participants are randomly allocated to conditions to decrease the effects of individual 
differences in performance and systematic error, thus research investigations that do not 
randomly allocate participants cannot rule out that their results may have been influenced by 
individual differences and error. Similarly, Dror et al.’s16 study lacked a control group, making 
inferences about the effects of contextual bias difficult. A final methodological flaw that was 
highlighted by Cooper and Meterko’s19 systematic review was that studies investigating bias in 
forensic science differed in their approach to how naive the participants were about the 
experimental designs and hypotheses, thus making it difficult to compare across studies, and 
differentiate when the effects of bias were down to the presentation of contextual information 
or when it was simply caused by demand characteristics.  
A second important question surrounding the experimental literature on contextual biases is, to 
what extent do laboratory experiments that induce bias translate to typical forensic decision-
making? This question is difficult to answer, as some research tested forensic scientists and the 
effects of context in the normal working environments of forensic scientists (e.g., Dror et al.16), 
whereas other studies have been conducted using small student-based samples in artificial 
environments (e.g., Dror et al.5). These different methods of investigating forensic bias relate 
to what Towler et al.51change this called operational and perceptual accuracy. Operational accuracy 
is tested when the decision making of forensic scientists is tested in studies that represent real-
life casework in operationally valid settings. In contrast, perceptual accuracy is measured in an 
experimental setting that is representative of real-life case work, but is not operationally valid, 
as commonly used tools and scales might not be available51 change, white Philips et al. 2015. Most 
research to date has focussed primarily on the latter over the former, meaning that the effects 
11 
 
of bias in real-life forensic decisions is still not fully understood51, and consequently needs 
more invesitation.  
In summary, despite the explosion of research relating to bias and forensic science, some of 
the previous research has been lacking in experimental rigour and ecological validity. 
Therefore, before recommendations and conclusions can be drawn about the effects of 
contextual information on forensic scientists in their daily decisions, future studies are needed 
which test the effects of bias on operational accuracy in ecologically valid settings using proper 
experimental designs. Because of these methodological limitations, the next section of this 
review will discuss an alternative account of the effects of contextual information on forensic 
judgments. 
 
The Good, the Bad and the Biased: Do biases equal error?  
Although contextual information might lead to biased decisions, this does not necessarily mean 
that forensic examiners who are presented with contextual information will make incorrect 
decisions. The aim of the current section, therefore, is to present commentary, theory and 
research supporting the idea that context does not necessarily lead to inaccurate decision 
making and that sometimes context (or bias) may promote accurate decision making.  
Searston, Tangen and Eva45 conducted three experiments to investigate whether or not 
contextual information had an effect on the accuracy of forensic judgments when analysing 
latent fingerprints, or whether it simply caused a response bias (or beta as it will now be referred 
to).  In their second experiment, Searston et al.45 found that the decisions forensic examiners 
made were biased by familiarity. Their experiment consisted of a learning phase followed by a 
test phase. In the learning phase, participants were given contextual information surrounding a 
case, then asked to make a decision (match vs. non-match). Participants were provided with 
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feedback in this initial stage, allowing participants to learn a false (i.e., experimentally induced) 
association between the decision match and the given context. Familiarity of context was 
associated with a decrease in accuracy, suggesting that familiarity may bias decisions and can 
lead to inaccurate decisions.  
In Searston et al.’s45 third experiment, they investigated whether similar fingerprints from 
previous mock trials could bias judgements in subsequent trials and thus change the accuracy 
of the decision maker. In this experiment, no context was provided, and participants were given 
the same latent fingerprints twice, once in the learning phase (with feedback) and once in the 
test phase (with no feedback). Participants performed worse in the test phase in comparison to 
the learning phase. This suggests that familiarity with fingerprints might bias individuals to 
make a decision consistent with the decision they made on a previous case with a similar 
looking fingerprint, thus biasing the forensic examiner and potentially leading to less accurate 
decisions.  
Further, Searston et al.’s45 second and third experiment showed, in line with previous research, 
that contextual information may cause individuals to make a biased or incorrect decision. 
However, this bias does not originate from contextual information regarding a case or a suspect, 
rather this bias originates with the experience of the forensic scientists regarding familiar pieces 
of evidence47. In other words, the more experience you have of evaluating fingerprints, the 
more fingerprints you have seen, which may leave you more vulnerable to Searston et al.’s45 
familiarity effect. Goldstein and Gigerenzer41 suggested that the experience (or expertise) an 
individual has with a particular environment can influence the accuracy of decision making, 
with no or too much experience having a negative effect on decision making. This is because 
if you have no knowledge of an environment you will not be able to reliably discriminate 
between two outcomes, whereas if you have too much information available to you, the 
complexity of the decision increases which can make it more difficult to choose the correct 
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option. They suggest that individuals with intermediate knowledge of an environment can make 
the most accurate decisions, as they use just enough information to discriminate between the 
options but not too many cues to be confused and overwhelmed by the information 41. However, 
it should be mentioned that in Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s41 research the participants were lay 
people who were asked to make decisions surrounding particular aspects of a city and which 
city was greater/lesser in regard to these aspects (e.g. the most populous city out of the two 
cities presented). Therefore, Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s41 work does not directly apply to 
forensic science, but their theoretical framework surrounding rationality that is bounded by the 
environment may help to aid why expertise can affect decisions in paradoxical ways.   
Dror47 offered an alternative explanation for why expertise may have a negative influence on 
forensic examiners. He suggested that expertise allows forensic experts to create schemas 
(mental models) of decisions and their associated environments, which can then create rigid 
thinking processes, thus limiting creativity and biasing the decision outcome to their previous 
experience. Similar to Searston et al.45, Dror47 suggested that familiarity with contextual and 
non-contextual (i.e., forensic evidence) information may cause an error, rather than the 
contextual information itself.  Expertise may lead to forensic decision makers utilising top 
down processes more than bottom up processes, which may cause the decision maker to rely 
on familiar information more than novel information. This may have some negative outcomes: 
1) the forensic decision maker may overestimate the importance of familiar information; 2) the 
forensic decision maker may underestimate the importance of novel information31,47. These 
top-down processes, however, will typically lead to more accurate decision making in simple 
and regular decisions, but may lead to error in complex and irregular decisions (i.e., when 
ambiguous information is present16, 31, 47. 
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However, Searston et al.’s45 first experiment highlighted that context does not always lead to 
inaccurate decisions, suggesting that some contextual information may randomly affect 
accuracy48. they found that case severity (high vs. low) had an impact on the beta of forensic 
examiners but did not influence their overall accuracy. In other words, forensic examiners were 
more likely to “match” a sample with a target in cases with high severity than in cases with low 
severity, but this tendency was not indicative of whether a correct match was established or 
not. Therefore, it can be said that context is not always a significant contributor to erroneous 
judgement.  
Langenburg, Champod and Wertheim49 found similar effects when comparing effect of context 
and expertise on errors and beta (decision outcome matched the contextual information) for 
matching unknown fingerprints with a fingerprint exemplar49. They found that novices were 
influenced more by bias than experts, and that the novice group made significantly more errors 
(number of errors = 46) than the expert group (number of errors = 4). This is in contrast to the 
findings discussed earlier, demonstrating that expertise effects are complex, and are likely to 
be affected by different contexts and types of decisions. Further, this highlights that the 
presence of biasing contextual information does not always lead to inaccurate decision making 
in expert forensic scientists. 
Kerstholt et al.50 investigated whether contextual information had an effect when assessing 
whether a bullet was fired from a certain firearm or not in two investigations. The first 
investigation found that contextual information had no effect on the decision outcome. In the 
second investigation, the researchers compared the decision of a first forensic scientist (the 
person who conducted the initial assessment) with the decision made by a second forensic 
scientist (the person who conducted the second assessment) in real-life cases. It was expected 
that the first examiner would have been more extreme as they would have had more contextual 
information available to them. The second examiner, however, gave a more biased answer and 
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were more likely than the first examiner to suggest that the firearm being assessed did fire the 
bullets being analysed than the first examiner. In addition, Kerstholt, Paashious, Sjerpsaddnumber 
found in a separate study that contextual information did not influence assessments in shoe 
print examinations. In summary, the studies by Searston et al.45, Langenburg et al.49, and 
Kerstholt et al.50 highlight that bias does not necessarily lead to more inaccurate decision 
making. Therefore, bias should not always be seen as negative, and more research is needed to 
consider whether bias can be beneficial and when bias has no effect.  
As mentioned before, some researchers have suggested that heuristics (cognitive short-cuts) 
and bias can lead to more accurate decision making. For instance, Goldstein and Gigerenzer41 
theorised about, and have since tested, fast and frugal heuristics that allow decisions to be made 
both quickly and accurately. They claimed that contextual/environmental information may be 
beneficial when making decisions as it scaffolds our limited cognitive structures (i.e., 
heuristics), thus bounding rationality to the environment. Further, they suggested that our 
minds have evolved to adapt to our environment, and that we have a toolbox of heuristics that 
allow us to access the best information quickly, rather than integrating all the information, to 
make a decision. These heuristics vary according to their ‘satisficing rule’ (from using one cue 
to a number of cues), but in each of the heuristics, it is the best piece of information (i.e., a 
piece of information that allows two outcomes to be discriminated against) that allows us to 
make good decisions quickly. In other words, information that biases decision processes may 
promote accurate and quick decision making. Goldstein and Gigerenzer41 also suggested that 
through interaction with the environment, we learn which pieces of information are most likely 
to be associated with the correct outcome, thus allowing fast and frugal decisions to be made. 
Furthermore, the fast and frugal paradigm has contributed two important findings to 
psychological research: 1) that the utilisation of environmental/contextual information is 
crucial to make accurate decisions; 2) bias may be beneficial to decision making. 
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Within an ecologically valid forensic setting it is indeed possible that some contextual 
information may be actually beneficial. For instance, Towler et al.51 stated that: “Unlike most 
experiments, the ratio of targets to non-targets in forensic contexts is almost certainly not 50:50” 
(p.204). In real-life forensic examinations, there will be a higher chance of samples being a 
match than a non-match51. Therefore, contextual information that biases forensic scientists in 
favour of the prosecution may actually induce correct decision making, even though the 
practice of utilising contextual information may be ethically questionable and not justifiable 
legally28; this will be discussed more later with the ‘criminalist paradox’. In addition, Rudin 
and Inman52 suggested that if a forensic scientist is unaware of the context surrounding the 
case, they may conduct tests that are either worthless or dangerous.  They propose that context 
is needed so that forensic scientists know which question to answer and this then informs the 
tests that are conducted and the evidence which is collected. They propose that contextual 
ignorance may have more of a negative effect on forensic evaluations than contextual bias does. 
Furthermore, in real-life laboratories contextual information and bias may aid forensic 
scientists to evaluate forensic evidence. 
Whitman and Koppl42 have suggested that the utilisation of context in forensic examiners may 
even be a rational endeavour. This is because the decision that is reached will be informed by 
both prior beliefs surrounding the accused’s guilt (which may have arisen from information 
from the police, and the subjective weight they place on incarcerating the guilty vs. the 
innocent) and evidence; thus, mirroring the updating of priors in Bayesian statistics. Further, 
Evett, Jackson, and Lambert43 proposed that DNA caseworkers use the Case Assessment and 
Interpretation (CAI) model. This model requires forensic scientists to seek as much contextual 
information as possible from the investigator. Evett et al.43 also suggested that the utilisation 
of contextual information allows examiners to update their beliefs in a manner that mirrors a 
Bayesian process of updating, thus hinting that contextual information may allow forensic 
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scientists to perform more rationally. Furthermore, forensic examiners who use contextual 
information may doing so in a manner that is associated with rational decision making.  
However, despite the potential positive effect of context when analysing forensic evidence, it 
may be legally/ethically unsuitable to use contextual information as it may lead to a ‘criminalist 
paradox’28 (p.130). Thompson28 stated that contextual information may aid forensic scientists 
to make the correct decision, as a forensic scientist may be aided in finding a correct match 
between fingerprints when they have learned that the suspect, from whom the latent 
fingerprints have been collected, has confessed. The problem arises when jurors have to decide 
on an appropriate verdict. According to standard Bayesian modelling, jurors should integrate 
each piece of information gained from evidence surrounding the guilt of the defendant 
independently of one another before arriving at a decision28, 37. However, if jurors are 
integrating confession evidence and forensic evidence independent of one another, when really 
each piece of evidence is correlated, then jurors will think that the likelihood of the suspect 
being guilty is much higher than it actually is28.  
For example, in a case which led to Josiah Sutton being incorrectly convicted of rape, the 
interpretations of a DNA mixture were influenced by the identification of the victim29. It was 
also reported that the victim’s testimony in court may have been influenced by the knowledge 
of the DNA results. The case against Josiah Sutton, according to Bayesian modelling, was weak 
as each piece of evidence was dependent on the other but was perceived as strong by the jury 
as they expected that each piece of evidence originated from independent sources29. 
Furthermore, contextual information may aid individual forensic analysts to make a correct 
judgement but may have serious negative implications surrounding the outcome of a trial by 
jury.  
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Nevertheless, despite the ‘criminalist paradox’ academics and practitioners in the forensic 
science community have commented on the utility of contextual information. For instance, 
Budowle et al.48 suggested that some contextual information aids the decision-making process 
of forensic examiners to prioritise the most meaningful examples when there is a plethora of 
evidence samples. Therefore, similar to Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s41 fast and frugal heuristics, 
information from the environment (i.e., context of case) may aid forensic decision makers to 
process and analyse the most useful samples, thus allowing the forensic examiner to make an 
accurate decision despite using limited resources (both cognitive and evidentiary)48. Kruse55 
advocated that contextual information surrounding a case (i.e., when the case occurred), 
familiarity with previous cases (experience of analysing similar types of materials), and 
teachings from colleagues allow forensic scientists to better evaluate forensic evidence. 
Further, Elaad57 proposed that contextual information may have a positive relationship with 
the accuracy of a judgement and does not always cause an inaccurate judgement to be reached. 
Butt56 even suggested that the negative effects of contextual bias are overestimated in 
psychological literature, and that contextual information may influence forensic scientists in a 
positive manner. In summary, the effects that context have on the judgements and analysis of 
forensic scientists may not always be negative.  
 
Conclusion 
The current body of knowledge surrounding the effects of context on forensic judgments and 
analysis has mostly suggested that contextual information may cause bias in forensic examiners 
when analysing different types of forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprint analysis, handwriting, 
and DNA mixture analysis). It has also been suggested that the biases created by contextual 
information may have a negative influence on the accuracy of the decisions made by forensic 
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scientists. However, because of methodological flaws (inaccurate inferential statistics; small 
sample sizes; no information on the allocation of groups) and problems with the ecological 
validity of previous experiments, these results may not generalise to the real-life judgments 
made by forensic scientists. Therefore, the current review aimed to present an alternative 
perspective which has been commented on by forensic scientists, researched by academics and 
is supported by the theorical framework of bounded rationality. This alternative perspective is 
that context (or bias) may not always influence forensic decisions in a negative manner, and 
that context may aid forensic scientists when making decisions regarding forensic evidence. 
To test this alternative perspective, we recommend that forensic scientists and cognitive 
psychologists collaborate to create rigorous and ecologically valid experiments that will be able 
test the effects that context and bias have on forensic scientists in operationally valid settings. 
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